Theory is being replaced by research, which is once again intended to be directly useful to the practice of architecture, and masters theses and PhDs are fast becoming design theses and creative practice PhDs. Whether this is a return to ideologically naive critica operativa that predates Rykwert and Tafuri, or whether practice is now itself refl ective, is a question that needs to be asked with a seriousness and a sophistication that we no longer possess. Whatever the case, it is timely to re-examine the history and theory of architecture through a reading of Rykwert's early work On Adam's House in Paradise, in particular as it is read by someone well-qualifi ed to appreciate its nuances and far-reaching consequences: the French philosopher, Benoît Goetz.
The four kinds of primitive hut
Before beginning any discussion of the primitive hut it is helpful to keep in mind that there are in fact four kinds of primitive hut. Firstly, there is the purely historical object treated dispassionately as simply a stage of building left behind in the progress towards today's house forms, by constructing better and better kinds of huts, the meliora genera casarum of Vitruvius. 4 Secondly, there is the hut revisited Thomas (2004: 39) .
3. For the claim that theory is dead in architectural education see Pasnik (1999) , Varnelis (1999) Speaks (2005 ), Vallier (2005 and Pavlovits (2005) . Note that this does not in fact invalidate Rykwert's thesis; the house in paradise is indeed heretical because, in Goetz's terms, the house introduces heterogeneity into a fi eld of purity. Once inside paradise it brings paradise to an end. Strictly speaking, the fi rst house is situated on the threshold of paradise and the Fall of Man. The failure to notice the implications of this new meaning of the primitive hut also led Kenneth Frampton (1973: 9) to surmise that "Rykwert's erudition seems to become gratuitously recondite. The structure becomes diffuse and the reader is projected into an anecdotal morass of facts, the relative relevance of each to the discourse at hand being left inexplicit." In effect, Frampton admits here that as a reviewer he had failed to grasp this new meaning.
Vitruvius Pollio (1931)
On
Rykwert's French reader
One who does not fail Rykwert as a reader is Benoît Goetz. 6 In his 2001 book La Dislocation: Architecture et Philosophie (Dislocation: Architecture and Philosophy), Goetz makes it very clear that Rykwert does indeed know that the Bible makes no mention of any house in paradise, and he continues:
We should allow this allegory to be subjected to a slight modifi cation of detail: in paradise Adam did not have a house. Or if he had one, it would not have been outside, and consequently would not have constituted an inside either. Paradisiac space is without division, strictly speaking it is nowhere and only the tree of knowledge introduces rupture into the fi eld of immanence such that an anywhere, a "this is paradise" becomes possible. On leaving this place, on leaving Place, the fi rst man and fi rst woman did not only discover suffering and shame, they discovered an outside, and by trying to construct an inside they then, and only then, invented architecture. The meaning of this apologia is that the partition of space that constitutes "the fi rst dislocation" is constitutive of architecture itself. (2001: 27) 7 Goetz extends Rykwert's theme of the persistent haunting vision of the fi rst house, which concerns everyone involved with building, into the theme of dislocation, which is the precondition of all human contact with the world. In both cases, however, it is something more fundamental than the nostalgia for a lost origin that can never be retrieved, the imagined hut that is used to show up the pretence of our over sophisticated luxury-dwellings, or the anthropological hut as a demonstration of the primal elements of architecture.
Goetz states that there was no Adam's house in the Garden of Eden because, prior to the expulsion from paradise, there could not have been any division of places nor any inside or outside. Paradise lacks nothing, so every space in it is equivalent to all other spaces; paradise is, in other words, an indivisible fi eld of immanence without otherness and without limit. The Expulsion, the fi rst dislocation, creates the fi rst division of inside and outside. Adam and Eve have to leave Eden. Now, therefore, the world is fragmented for the fi rst time into Eden and non-Eden. This fi rst division is constitutive of architecture as such, so it is only after the Fall that Adam can build the fi rst house. The Expulsion from Paradise is also the fracturing or singularisation of spaces. Space is "architectured", and this architecturality of space is the precondition for architecture.
Thinking from architecture
So, rather than a single event, dislocation is something that never stops taking place. This is how Goetz thinks from architecture rather than refl ecting on it. Architecture for him is not an object to be encountered in some pre-established philosophical fi eld, it is the fi eld of thought itself. So, instead of confi ning architecture to aesthetics and academic problems of form and style, Goetz's strategic shift makes architecture become what he calls an "ethical substance", 8 a physics of space touching the very heart of existence, because existences cannot be disposed and dislocated without there fi rst being an "architecturalisation" of space that makes the world a place of heterogeneous spaces with multiple insides and outsides. "The 'doctrine' that would render architecture worthy of consideration," writes Goetz, would not belong to the technological register nor the aesthetic register. It would lie in this affi rmation that architecture is a way of setting up a modus vivendi between man and the space in which he moves. It would consist of hazarding a proposition that architecture is an 'ethical substance', to borrow one of Michel Foucault 's terms. (2001: 86) Architecture, in Goetz's view, is the very thought of space, therefore well able to teach us about the art of living or the way of being in the world. So, by thinking from architecture, Goetz arrives at an architectural physics of space (the theme of the second chapter of his book), an architectural ethics (chapter three), a political theory of places (chapter four), and a noetics or spatial condition of thought (chapter fi ve). Because thought cannot be everywhere and nowhere as if we were still in paradise, thought must be placed somewhere, it therefore depends on certain preconditions of space. Therefore, all great thinkers also invent a singular way of dwelling, they "make the world" in different ways and this is above all, claims Goetz, what makes their thought essentially different. Heidegger makes the world differently from how Levinas makes the world, to use Goetz's example.
Goetz's redefi nition of architecture as an endlessly recurring event of dislocation at once solves the problem of where architecture sits in relation to the other arts and, curiously, this takes us directly to the heart of the matter of Rykwert's latest book, The Judicious Eye: Architecture against the Other Arts (2008) . The Judicious Eye
Goetz borrows this term from Michel
Foucault, see The Foucault Reader, edited Rabinow (1991: 353) , where Foucault gives the following examples of "ethical substances": for the Greeks it was aphrodisia, the acts, gestures and contacts that produce pleasure and for Christians it is fl esh, the carnal body as a source of sinful temptation. The point being that in both cases (aphrodisia for the Greeks, "fl esh" for the Christians) the "ethical substance" is the material to be worked over by the practice of ethical living. chronicles, with Rykwert's typical thoroughness and characteristically digressive style, the decline of architecture as the synthesis of the arts or Gesamtkunstwerk and revisits the many failed attempts to bring art and architecture together. The implicit yardstick for such a synthesis is of course disegno (investigative drawing), the defi ning concept of the Renaissance. Disegno is the art of drawing that uncovers the Platonic eidos or ideal form behind appearances, which Alberti, Vasari and others saw as the unifying technique underlying architecture, painting and sculpture. This unifi cation through disegno, however, cannot be sustained outside a Platonic world view. If we no longer believe in the existence of any underlying essence, how can the arts be unifi ed by their search for it? So the location of architecture among the arts is once again cast adrift in the Romantic period and we still carry the burden of this legacy today. For example, in a small sample of the many discussions on architecture taking place after the Renaissance, by two philosophers who have been very infl uential in the discourse on the arts, we fi nd Kant placing architecture alongside sculpture as a Kunstoffkünst or "plastic art". Kant inherits the French opposition between beaux-arts, the fi ne arts, and arts mécaniques, the mechanical or applied arts. He then divides the fi ne arts into a further three categories consisting of the arts of speech (rhetoric and poetry), the formative arts, and the play of sensations (music and colour). The formative, or form-making, arts are further divided into plastic arts (sculpture and architecture) and painting. The plastic arts use fi gures in space, the "sensuous truth", while the non-plastic art of painting relies on "sensuous semblance." Sculpture differs from architecture in that only sculpture directs our attention to purely aesthetics ends. "In architecture," Kant (1988: 186) explains, "the chief point is a certain use of the artistic object to which, as the condition, the aesthetic ideas are limited." Then there is Hegel's (1975) well-known placement of architecture on the bottom rung of all the arts, which are now placed in a serial and teleological development towards ever more fl uid ways of capturing the human spirit (fi rst architecture, then sculpture, then painting, music, drama, poetry and so on). This is a position from which architecture has struggled to elevate itself ever since. So, for example, in our own time it is hard to imagine architecture holding the attention of the public for long, since they now have such easy access to the faster-moving arts of music and fi lm, and efforts to make architecture more musical or fi lmic by making it reactive or mobile seem to have their basis in a system of the arts that precludes anything other than failure in advance for architecture. So, once again, when placed alongside the other stronger and less constrained arts, architecture is presented as a frail and overburdened art form.
The singularity of architecture
In place of these regional descriptions of architecture as one (usually quite minor) art or discipline among other arts and disciplines, Goetz gives us, based on his reading of Rykwert in Heideggerian terms, the singularity of architecture. According to this view, architecture need no longer be compared unfavourably to other stronger, more developed and more expressive forms of art. Firstly, because architecture forms the framework for all the arts and secondly, because it is not itself framed in the same way. Nevertheless architecture is not in a position to judge or control the arts in any way simply because it is the stage, the workshop, the theatre, the studio, the gallery and so on: it only appears with them as part of the same situation or event. Architecture is the framework for the other arts and disciplines but architecture is not itself framed. It passes beyond the boundaries of built form to participate in all human activities, as "a space that surrounds the bodies that inhabit it", as Goetz so delicately puts it:
A work of architecture is not limited by the envelope of the building, but that it works on the fi eld outside the envelope, that it makes itself explicit with the outside. Architecture is, in essence, bordered by the space that surrounds the bodies that inhabit it. Any work of architecture is an opening to that which it is not, to that which it neither relates to nor comprehends. It listens with surprise to what it calls forth and provokes. Above all it makes something happen that is not of the order of art. Thought, actions, attitudes are carried and sustained by it. Thus there is no architecture without a non-architectural assemblage that architecture thereafter contributes to the construction of. Sébastian Marot is not uninspired when he speaks about a "constructed situation" to name a space in the singular (as a synonym for architecture). The difference therefore is this, works of art take place in the world, a work of architecture is one moment of this world where we, works of art and other things coexist. (2001: 20-21) In place of architecture taking a minor place among the arts we have an architectural singularity, a moment of the world in which everything takes place including the other arts, ourselves, our thoughts, our actions and attitudes, a moment in time when everything coexists. Architecture is the condition of our existence, says Goetz. Little wonder, then, that he adds that architecture listens with astonishment (étonnement) to what it calls forth, what it frames. This sense of astonishment refl exively leaves its mark on the works of architecture themselves because "edifi ces sont de 'drôles de choses'" ("buildings are 'droll things'"), says Goetz (2001: 23) . When one searches in Google for images under the title drôles de choses one will fi nd pictures of, among other things, a small car mounting a truck tyre, a square of sidewalk splashed in paint that looks like a beautiful abstract painting, and an old tradesman's boot with a Nike label attached to it. Invariably, these are scenes from everyday life that are unexpectedly funny or beautiful. Buildings are strangely humorous and beautiful because "our existence resides in and concerns itself with architectural spaces." This is why architecture is always, in some way, a hollowed out cast of those beings whose essence resides in and concerns itself with its existence. Architecture is a technology of beings whose essence lies in existing between the walls of architecture. " (2001: 23) In brief, buildings are droll because we witness with astonishment what they bring forth as negative imprints of own selves.
Dislocation as factical dispersion
The dislocation inherent in human existence is an event that has two aspects, the fi rst of which has nothing to do with architecture. The fi rst dislocation is a property of human existence, our essential dispersion, our scattering and distraction towards a multiplicity of spaces. In Heideggerian terms it is Dasein's faktische Zerstreuung or factical dispersion/distraction (Goetz: 30). Heidegger has this to say about it in Being and Time:
Dasein's facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed [zerstreut] itself or even split itself up into defi nite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is indicated by the following examples: having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining … (Heidegger 1990: 83) Heidegger differentiates the "factual" (tatsächlich), the fact of being present-tohand, from the "factical" (faktisch), taken up into human existence, but not necessarily proximally close. Factical dispersion is, therefore, the human ability to expand the individual's sphere of concern beyond the body's immediate vicinity to ever-increasing numbers of spheres until we are in a state of continuous distraction away from our present location.
To exist is therefore to (self) dis-locate, existence is dis-location. Dislocation is our essential dispersion; we are scattered, expanded, distracted by a spatial multiplicity … . A "factical dispersion" (faktische Zerstreuung) belonging properly to Dasein. This dispersion is no different from the original spatiality of Dasein (from its Räumlichkeit). (Goetz 2001: 30) The second aspect of dislocation does involve architecture: it is what we do with the fi rst existential dislocation. We dispose of it. We cover over human distraction with compositions that hide the fi rst dislocation. So, where Dasein's facticity is dispersed into a multiplicity of ways of being-in -having to do with, producing, attending to, looking after, making use of, and so on -buildings used as structures to house these multiple ways of dwelling pull Dasein together and unify its spheres of concern. It is no surprise, then, that Heidegger's list of ways of being-in should sound very much like the necessary steps that an architect must take in designing a human habitat: fi rst they have to do something with the existing habitat, then they must produce something new which is attended to, drawn up, and further looked after and improved upon until it is fi nally made use of by others, and then they have to let it go, leaving others to inhabit what they have built but also clearing their minds, offi ces and schedules in order to be able take on new projects. Goetz thoughtfully applies Heidegger's uncovering of Dasein's ontological dispersal to architecture and fi nds that:
Architecture 'composes' with this fi rst dislocation of the existents from existence, by dis-posing their places, in other words by distinguishing them, separating them, specifying them. The 'dis-' of dis-location is not therefore, to start with, anything destructive … not therefore a catastrophe, an annihilation, an apocalypse ... It is an event, a cascade of events that has always occurred from the beginning, but one that architectural modernity will leave uncovered. Because architecture has also been the activity that most fi ercely resists the remembering of the fi rst ontological dispersion, by erecting fortresses against the outside, monuments to tyranny and temples to house the gods. (Goetz 2001: 30) As the etymological origin of the term archi-tecture indicates an art of control, Goetz adds, "all power is exercised architecturally". Any power able to give things a location is, in effect, architectural, and this power is synonymous with religious ritual and the sanctifi cation of places. Dislocation, from this point of view, is the moment when a space becomes de-sacralised. This is why the primary existential dislocation is left uncovered by modernity and the death of God. Here Goetz's thinking might fruitfully lead us towards the profound spectulations of Jean-Luc Nancy (1991: 110-150) on divine spaces and Massimo Cacciari's (1993) neglected work on architecture and nihilism, both of which well deserve to be reexamined in more detail for their architectural implications. Note that Nancy did in fact contribute an excellent preface to Goetz's book which deserves to be analysed in its own light.
Microspherical architectural space
Architecture composes, and disposes of, the fundamental human quality of being dispersed among many places and many spheres of interest. It responds to the fi rst dislocation by making many re-locations for human activities: factories for working, libraries for reading, schools for learning, hospitals for convalescing, giving birth and dying in, and so on. Thus, it is part of an effort to cover over the original dislocation with a multiplicity of locations. The relocation of human activities in specifi c locations, however, requires great force and is traditionally bound up with religion and the making of sacred places, or with the tyrannical building of walls and the necessary policing of movement through their openings this brings.
The spatiality of human life is split into an ever-increasing multiplicity of places, as is attested by the third volume of Peter Sloterdijk's Sphären (Spheres), which deals with today's human microsphere in a section headed "Foam Architectures". 9 "One can speak of the presence of an egosphere," Sloterdijk tells us elsewhere, when its inhabitant has developed elaborate habits of self-pairing and regularly moves within a constant process of differentiation from himself -that is, in Erleben (experience). Such a form of life would be misunderstood if one were to fi xate only on the attribute of living alone in the sense of being partner-less, or incomplete as a human being. The nonsymbiosis with others that is practiced by the single occupant in the apartment turns out, after closer investigation, to be an autosymbiosis. Here, the form of the couple is fulfi lled in the individual, who, in constant differentiation from himself, perpetually relates to himself as the inner other, or as a multitude of sub-egos. (2007b: 96-97) According to Sloterdijk's analysis, the individual adapts to the contemporary dislocation into multiple microspheres by narcissistically self-pairing. Sloterdijk names some of today's microspheres: that zone close to hand, which is now overfl owing with handy and essential appliances; the individualised sound bubble of portable players and cell phones; the zone of autoeroticism in which the individual becomes both the lover and the object of love; the private gym for the trainer-trainee; and the sphere where the autodidact performs cognitive self-care. Reading Rykwert's On Adam's House alongside Goetz's Dislocation, it appears that Sloterdijk's innovative spherology is, strangely, a continuation of Rykwert's exploration of the primitive hut as a recurring concept as old as architecture itself. The primitive hut is a perennial theme in architecture because it exposes the permanent dislocation of human existence into multiple spheres of interest. The primitive hut is, after all, where one can be, if one wants to be, an historian, anthropologist, archaeologist, horticulturalist, primitivist and so on, each activity corresponding to unique spheres of concern.
10 The hut promises to locate us in nature, yet it fails to return us to a state of unknowing nature since it must take place after the Fall from paradise and after the introduction of the heterogeneity of inside and outside into any fi eld of immanence. Instead, it returns us to our existential dispersal into multiple spheres of interest: hence the incessant attraction of the Japanese tea house in the mountains or the New Zealand bach by the sea. Their knowing naivety draws us in by promising to return us to some kind of therapeutic harmony with nature and at once reveals this desire to be the very product of our highly self-conscious and refl ective existence.
The primitive haunts our work whenever we are self-consciously naive: the Adams Cheng Residence, Avondale, Auckland, Design and photo: Elizabeth Cheng 10. For a well-documented argument that the New Zealand bach is a site that provides the time and opportunity to enable its inhabitants to become masters of multiple disciplines, see Cox (1995) .
